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Abstract
In today’s neo-liberalist world, Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) face many difficulties combining contemporary financial 
thinking with Islamic, faith-based principles, on which their day-to-day operations ought to be based. Hence, IFI are likely 
to experience shifts/changes in organizational and ethical identity due to tensions that the combination of these principles 
invokes. We present an in-depth case study that focuses on these shifts in a major European based IFI across a 14-year period. 
We conceptualize identity change as drift, highlighting the multivocal nature of identity construction. The ethico-faith prin-
ciples that were meant to serve as living codes of ethics guiding the IFI’s organizational culture, operational processes, and 
strategy formation turned out to mainly have been discursively rationalized to respond to regulatory, market and institutional 
imperatives. The company is aware that it needs to engage in a continuous dialogue with those who set these requirements. 
Its ethico-faith principles may consequently be adapted quite radically, especially in periods of turmoil and takeover, as we 
show across the analysed time period. The paper provides valuable insights for faith-inspired organizations to reflect on the 
extent to which they wish to engage in the discursive justification and legitimization of current market hegemonies, whilst 
they actively encourage their managers to behave ethically as well.
Keywords Multivocality · Ethical identity · Organizational identity drift
Introduction
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) are widely seen as aspir-
ing to provide faith-based financial products and services to 
their clients that avoid interest (usury or riba) related trans-
actions and other activities that are deemed to be exploitative 
and speculative (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007; Warde 2010). It 
is assumed that, by taking this approach, ethically viable 
and acceptable transactions will result. However, it has been 
noted that making ethically viable transactions may face IFI 
with difficult economic decisions due to the fundamental 
clash between the ontotheology of IFI and the epistemology 
of conventional financial institutions (Maurer 2001).
Competitive market pressures to conform to neo-liberal-
ist principles may lead to the development and approval of 
products that would be deemed unethical from an Islamic 
perspective (Akhtar et al. 2008; Fang 2014; Warde 2010). 
In this context it may be difficult for IFI to provide financial 
services that fully preserve their faith-based ethical creden-
tials (Fang 2014; Hidayah et al. 2018; Maurer 2012; Pitluck 
2012). Maurer (2012) argues that IFI may consequently 
engage in a variety of interpretative and political practices 
that enable them to operate in a world where neo-liberalism 
and market logics dominate. Thereby, they may ‘transcend’ 
their purely ethico-faith identity and (claim to) effectively 
engage in a neo-liberally dominant financial ‘world’ without 
sacrificing their basic principles too much (Hegazy 2006; 
Pollard and Samers 2013).
This paper focuses on the context and day-to-day opera-
tions of such interpretive and political practices. It seeks 
to understand how organizations try to accommodate the 
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socio-economic factors affecting (the portrayal of) their ethico-
faith identities, whilst sticking to the principles underlying 
identities as much as possible. This will likely cause tensions, 
as the institutions have to entertain these neo-liberalist princi-
ples and may feel pressurized to introduce modified business 
practices. We seek to identify these tensions.
Our analysis in based on a process perspective of organi-
zational identity (Alvesson and Robertson 2016). This per-
spective challenges the notions of centrality and distinctive-
ness that lead to reification or the belief in the “thing-like” 
nature of organizational identity (Corley 2004; Gioia et al. 
2013). In further exploring a process perspective of organi-
zational identity, we base our analysis on the concept of 
drift (Alvesson and Robertson 2016; Ciborra 2000; Gherardi 
2006; Quattrone and Hopper 2001), which regards processes 
underlying both organizational and ethical identity construc-
tions as being incomplete by default (Beech 2008; Svenings-
son and Alvesson 2003).
Furthermore, we contribute to emerging discussions on 
ethical identity (Balmer et al. 2007; Koning and Waistell 
2012; Verbos et al. 2007) by arguing that drift occurs as 
organizations embrace the multivocal nature of the pro-
cesses that guide identity constructions. Our case organi-
zation shows the ability to tune in to the voices of various 
actors/institutions. The forces and feedback from wider 
participants induce self-reinforcing actions that play in the 
ongoing re(construction) of the organization’s ethical iden-
tity. This paper also provides valuable insights for IFI and 
other faith-inspired organizations to reflect on the discursive 
positioning (Antaki et al. 1996) of their institution, and the 
extent to which they wish to engage in the justification and 
legitimization of the currently dominant way of rationalizing 
market hegemonies in particular, as they actively encourage 
their businesses and business managers to behave ethically, 
in line with Islamic faith-based principles.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, 
we explore the literature on organizational and ethical iden-
tity, which evolves into a discussion about drift. Drift is con-
ceptualized as a process of identity becoming. Secondly, we 
outline the context, method, our approach to data collection 
and the approach we take in our analysis. In the sections 
thereafter, we explore three evolutionary processes of drift 
that we identify in our case context to translate/modify a 
particular IFI’s ethico-faith identity given certain external 
influences it is faced with. We complete the paper by provid-
ing some conceptual and practical insights.
Ethical Identity
Studies of organizations frequently define identity as a set of 
subjective meanings and experiences collected by organiza-
tional members that help to address questions related to the 
core features of an organization, its self-image, or its dis-
tinctive character (Alvesson and Robertson 2016; Whetten 
2006). Concerns over identity arise as organizations seek 
to distinguish themselves from other, similar organizations 
(Alvesson et al. 2008; Brown 2018). The existence of organi-
zational identity is assumed to allow organizational mem-
bers to describe what is central, distinctive, and enduring 
about their organization and how these characteristics act as 
a perceptual screen or filter that influences the way organiza-
tions process and interpret information (Dutton et al. 1994; 
Gioia and Thomas 1996).
Organizations claim an identity to define what the organi-
zation stands for (Alvesson et al. 2008; Ravasi and Phillips 
2011). That part of organizational identity that is constituted 
by the living codes of ethics that guide organizational cul-
ture, operational processes, strategy and leadership issues, 
such as ethical and social goals/missions, is sometimes 
referred to as an organization’s ethical identity (Verbos 
et al. 2007). It has been argued that an organization’s ethi-
cal beliefs and viewpoints (Berrone et al. 2007) are equally 
as important as their profit motives in shaping organizational 
life, especially in the case of Co-operative or Islamic banks 
(Balmer et al. 2007; Berrone et al. 2007; Haniffa and Hudaib 
2007). An organization’s ethical identity is often believed to 
be the result of an ethicalization process (Gray and Balmer 
2001; Romani and Szkudlarek 2014). In this process, it is 
surmised that ethical beliefs/viewpoints prevailing in an 
organization can contradict with existing organizational pre-
scriptions, which either requires a transformation or resolu-
tion (Voronov and Vince 2012) to create a new conscious-
ness of organizational identity (Giorgi et al. 2014; Giorgi 
and Palmisano 2017). A mismatch might appear between 
the personal understandings of organizational members and 
the ethical ideals being promoted by an organization, or it 
may arise from members’ encounters with stakeholders that 
challenge the understandings of the organization’s ethical 
beliefs (Alvesson and Willmott 2002; Klein 2001).
These circumstances effectively shape ethical identity as 
temporary and context-sensitive, representing an evolving 
set of constructions associated with the dynamic character 
of the larger social ‘world’ or milieu (Alvesson et al. 2008). 
Ethical identities are ascribed as always in-progress and 
continually being appropriated and negotiated in response 
to changing external stimuli, circumstances and interests 
(Sillince and Brown 2009; Thornborrow and Brown 2009). 
In exploring changes in ethical identity, it is crucial to reflect 
on Alvesson and Robertson (2016) criticism on the way most 
of the associated literature (Corley and Gioia 2003; Gioia 
et al. 2000, 2013) has reified organizational identity. This 
literature has typically framed the organization as an individ-
ual who is or can be made aware of whom he/she is (is not) 
as compared to other organizations. The process of identity 
change might more appropriately be viewed as iterative and 
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often unstable in response to multiple embedded, overlap-
ping and interrelated discourses at both organizational and 
societal levels (Brown 2018), in which one particular ‘voice’ 
or discourse may suddenly or unexpectedly appear to be 
stronger or more prominent than other ‘voices’ or discourses, 
as discussed in the following conceptualization.
Conceptualizing Drift in the Process 
of Becoming: The Multivocality of Ethical 
Identity
An organization’s ethical identity is not permanently static 
and cannot be separated from its environment (Gherardi 
2006; Quattrone and Hopper 2001), as we discussed in the 
previous section. It is an ongoing accomplishment, or a pro-
cess of becoming (Alvesson and Robertson 2016). The ethi-
cal identity of an organization is a somewhat messy collage 
that results from negotiations, deals, improvisations and lay-
ers of appropriations that respond to the sheer complexity of 
organizational life (Ciborra 2000). An organization’s ethical 
stance does not operate as a linear progression from a fixed 
and clearly identifiable point A (an organization’s former or 
current state) to a fixed and equally identifiable point B (its 
current or desired future position). Organizations embrace 
multiple voices, forces and feedback mechanisms from mul-
tiple actors that create self-reinforcing actions at play in the 
construction, corroboration, and progression of ethical iden-
tity in everyday organizational life (Ciborra 2000). Hence, 
identity is always in flux.
In infusing and sustaining particular ethical viewpoints, 
organizations naturally engage in ethical identity drift, and 
slight (and not so slight) deviations from their planned 
purposes. Viewing organizational change as drift enables 
researchers to explore the unpredictability and consequently 
the uncontrollability of change. In the process of drift, 
organizations might experience gradual loss of clarity as 
they interact with various stakeholders (Balmer et al. 2007; 
Koning and Waistell 2012; Oliver et al. 2010). In the drift 
of ethical identity, organizations either have to engage in 
‘invisible mending’ through which organizational identity 
is translated to restore and collectively enact the (seemingly 
existing) ‘status quo’, or by extending or adapting existing 
prescriptions of organizational practices through discursive, 
material, as well as emotional alignment (Gherardi 2006, 
p. 181).
Any drift entails a long, tortuous, and fragile process of 
alignment of various interests, powers and authorities that 
is never completely resolved (Ciborra 2000). In our case, 
drift represents an organization’s ability to embrace differ-
ent voices and develop a singular, multi-rationality ethi-
cal identity. The multivocality of ethical identity enables 
organizations, and organizational members in particular, to 
respond to struggles that automatically come with multi-
ple and competing interests or sets of beliefs or knowledge 
of appropriate organizational practices under specific cir-
cumstances, in which it can never be said upfront which 
set of beliefs will come to dominate. Organizational change 
consequently can no longer be viewed as a transition from 
one state to another as judged from a single perspective/
rationality. Rather, it may be interpreted more appropriately 
as a process in which organizational practices construct and 
make sense of multiple knowledge, actions and rationalities 
to achieve a temporary, but incomplete resolution. Not eve-
rybody is likely to be fully satisfied with whatever is deemed 
to be the ‘outcome’ of these processes, given the diverse 
range of interests involved.
Studies in IFI practices reflect elements of the drift from 
the ideal equity-based transactions/products, which promote 
partnership and entrepreneurial activities, into debt-based 
transactions/products that are more acceptable to contempo-
rary Western banking and financial markets (Diwany 2010; 
Fang 2014; Siddique and Iqbal 2017). An IFI’s ethical iden-
tity can be seen as an evolutionary adaptation and ingenu-
ous innovation to dominant social, market and legal institu-
tional settings (Pitluck 2012; Vogel 2000). It may be argued 
that the drift of an IFI’s ethical identity typically manifests 
itself in the shift from thick/normative to thin/procedural 
and legalistic conceptions and the fabrication of religious 
compliant financial instruments (Hegazy 2006; Pollard and 
Samers 2013). The legal policies/decisions (fatwa) associ-
ated with the ethical identity in IFI are repositioned or modi-
fied to cope with the extant logics and values of contempo-
rary financial markets (Ullah et al. 2012). This drift can also 
be seen in the nature of IFI product development, which has 
determined the state of the art in global finance and Islamic 
financial products (Akhtar et al. 2008). The introduction of 
fixed returns on Islamic financial products (Hidayah et al. 
2018) or the use of what is conceived as Islamic substitutes 
of conventional derivative products represent a move away 
from an earlier, ostensibly more authentic ethical identity 
(Maurer 2001; Rethel 2017).
Exploring the drift of ethical identity enables researchers 
to unveil the processes through which actors seek to bal-
ance multiple voices of different authorities that have vari-
ous interests and order to deliver appropriate responses to 
their wider environment, from both inside and outside of 
an organization (Oliver et al. 2010). Ethical identity may 
be seen to be more socially connected, open and reflexive, 
as organizations construct more responsive types of organi-
zational practices (Balmer et al. 2007). This conceptualiza-
tion provides the main motivation for this research: how do 
organizations accommodate the socio-economic circum-
stances they are faced with, as well as the multiple, and per-
haps partially overlapping interests and demands affecting 
the portrayal of) their ethical identity, whilst retaining the 
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underlying, original Islamic principles associated with its 
ethico-faith identity?
Research Context, Method and Design
To address the research question, we investigate how a par-
ticular IFI, the Ethical Trust Bank (ETB), which is one of 
seven fully-fledged IFI operating in Europe,1 engaged in the 
adaptation or rationalization of specific ethico-faith princi-
ples within its contingent socio-economic and regulatory 
circumstances. The focal point of our research is the drift 
of these principles in incomplete attempts at organizing an 
ethico-faith based financial institution that fully adheres to 
its original Islamic outlook.
Research Context
ETB has operated for almost fourteen years in one of the 
leading European financial markets. Following its incorpo-
ration in 2004, ETB aspired to provide ethico-faith banking 
alternatives. ETB claimed that Islamic principles (Shariah) 
stressed the importance of honesty, transparency, account-
ability and ethics in structuring and executing its business 
and commercial affairs (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2007; Thomas 
et al. 2005; Warde 2010). For instance, the ethical principles 
of Shariah prohibit ETB from engaging in interest-based 
activities, the trading of forbidden objects (e.g. the breed-
ing of pigs, sale and distribution of alcohol, and gambling 
businesses), accepting excessive uncertainty, and taking gain 
without either exerting effort or accepting liability (Khir 
et al. 2008). ETB was expected by its stakeholders to deliver 
ethico-faith-based financial products dedicated to empower-
ing society through partnership and philanthropic activities.
In practice, the ethico-faith perspective of finance 
described above often turns out to contradict the logics of 
modern, neo-liberalist banking practices. ETB had no other 
option but to translate the ethico-faith principles it adhered 
to meet the internal and external demands it faced. We assert 
that ETB has modified its ethico-faith vision in three distinct 
episodes of change whilst trying to maintain the ethico-faith 
commitment of its business practices. ETB’s ethico-faith 
principles have been represented in its value statements 
and Articles of Associations, which have clearly changed 
over time as a result of the company’s desire and regulators’ 
demands to meet regulatory requirements, as well as through 
ETB’s response to market and shareholder demands as it 
went through several company takeovers.
The first episode of ETB’s ethical identity change took 
place in the early stage of ETB’s life, and essentially between 
2004 and 2006. ETB had to get established as a serious bank 
in a country known as one of the main financial hubs in 
Europe. ETB had to modify its ethico-faith references to 
incorporate the ‘voice’ of the banking regulator of that par-
ticular country. The ethico-faith references in ETB’s initial 
Article of Association had to be appropriated to follow regu-
latory prescriptions, as we will analyse below.
The second episode of change took place between 2006 
to the end of 2013. The pressures from market competi-
tion to offer different services, and offer existing services 
differently, together with increasing financial losses had a 
substantial impact on ETB’s performance until 2009. From 
the third quarter of 2009 onward, ETB decided to engage 
in reverse engineering practices of its financial products, 
thereby effectively replicating the structure and effect of 
particular, conventional banking products. ETB also sold 
its majority ownership in 2010, which brought in additional 
capital to sustain its operations. The company’s new man-
agement, from 2010 to 2013, supported the idea of respond-
ing to market pressures by changing its approach to product 
development and accommodated its then current ethico-faith 
commitment to follow the market practices.
In the third episode, further changes of ETB’s ethico-faith 
orientation can be witnessed. This happened in particular 
in the period between 2014 and 2018, when ETB tried to 
fulfil shareholder ambitions to a greater extent than before. 
In 2013–2014, ETB suffered from further liquidity problems 
that required another sale of company ownership to a foreign 
investment company. This company took over ETB’s owner-
ship in 2014 as part of the strategy to scale up its business in 
the European market. It bought ETB’s majority ownership 
for £76 million. The new owner explicitly stated his ambi-
tion to become the leader of Islamic banking products and 
services in this particular hub of the European financial mar-
ket. First of all, it was decided to change ETB’s name into 
‘NewETB’ to freshen up its identity, and the way it was seen 
on the market. In addition, NewETB’s CEO and managing 
director adopted a totally different business approach than 
the previous CEOs and managing directors, which allowed 
them to leverage the ethico-faith label (which the rebranded 
bank still says it adheres to) further and engage in more prac-
tices commonly adopted by conventional banks. NewETB 
now focuses strongly on products and returns that have a 
similar structure and nature to its competitors, which do not 
necessarily follow Islamic, faith-based principles in their 
operations. Focusing on premium investors and highly lever-
aged financing or syndication deals has allowed NewETB to 
strengthen its performance markedly.
1 There are currently five fully-fledged IFI operating in the UK, Ger-
many, Denmark and Bosnia. This study obscures the identity of the 
case organization and the specific country where it operates, due to 
the confidentiality agreement that was signed with its representatives.
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Method
This study contains a qualitative case study, involving inter-
views and observations on the case organization’s opera-
tions, which is supported by an extensive analysis on the 
company documentations across a 14 year period. We seek 
to examine the way ETB has tried to transcend various 
socio-economic contingent event, issues and circumstances 
affecting its ethical identity construction over the years, 
albeit with mixed results. We explore how ETB embraced 
multiple rationalities and praxis by aligning multiple actors’ 
voices in spatiotemporal sequences of ethical identity drift 
(Alvesson and Robertson 2016; Ciborra 2000; Gherardi 
2006; Quattrone and Hopper 2001). Through the case study 
we try to understand how processes of drift in ethical princi-
ples took form as indigenous organizational beliefs/interests 
and exogenous forces associated with the market and regula-
tory structures interacted across three time periods.
Data Collection
We collected our data across 6 months at ETB’s main site, 
where we were able to conduct observations and inter-
views around ETB’s daily operations, and were allowed 
to view company documentation that we deemed rel-
evant to changes in ETB’s ethical identity. In total, we 
conducted 30 interviews with ETB’s managers/staff and 
external stakeholders, including 6 influential individuals 
in the national banking and financial regulatory institu-
tions and 3 international regulators. We also interviewed 
a Shariah Officer who had previously worked for ETB, a 
number of ethical advisors, customers and other commu-
nity members, as shown in Table 1. During the period of 
case study, we participated in a two-day session, in which 
community members and several scholars discussed how 
they felt about ETB’s past and current operations. We also 
observed several discussions between ETB and the global 
banking industry representatives at annual conferences/
workshops that took place in the 2013–2018 period.
The data from the interviews and observations have 
been triangulated with internal documentation and exter-
nal regulatory reports and other relevant information dat-
ing from the 2004 to 2018 period. Those documents and 
reports, as listed in Table 2, have been especially insightful 
for examining the way ETB embraced and dealt with the 
(occasionally changing) ‘voice’ of shareholders, regula-
tors, the banking industry and market participants that 
affected its ethical identity (construction).
We have reconstructed, in as much detail as space 
allows, the drift of ETB’s ethical identity across three 
different stages of the company’s life, from its inception in 
2004 through to the first quarter of 2018. Data have been 
supplemented by publicly available information about 
ETB/NewETB value commitment, market developments 
as well as broader socio-economic developments that have 
affected the ethical identity during the 14 years period.
Data Analysis
The interviews were typically transcribed and analysed 
using NVivo 9.2 qualitative data analysis software. We were 
requested not to record our two interviews with an inter-
nal audit manager and a treasury officer. Notes were taken 
in these cases, which were shown to the interviewees for 
comments and approval. We assembled our data across the 
three time episodes that have been mentioned earlier and 
categorized them based on changes in identity resulting from 
tensions between Islamic and neo-liberalist financial prin-
ciples, taking into account the discursive positioning of our 
interviewees (Antaki et al. 1996; Klitsie et al. 2018), nego-
tiations and dialogic constructions that could be singled out 
(Beech 2008; Sveningsson and Alvesson 2003). We devel-
oped themes that were prevalent and recurrent in each of the 
three episodes, in order to understand what had happened. 
We identified the internal and external contingent factors, 
that we believed enabled these processes of ethical identity 
drift. We found multiple instances in which ETB (re)con-
structed its ethical identity in order to respond to regulatory 
and market pressures, as well as to shareholder ambitions. 
Our analysis suggested the drift of ethical identity occurred 
in an evolutionary process, as ETB embraced the internal 
Table 1  Research participants
Research partici-
pants
ETB External partici-
pants
Total
Regulator Local: 6
International: 3
Total: 9 9
Manager/Officer Manager/Officer: 9 Previous Man-
ager: 1
Managing Direc-
tor: 1
Shariah Officer: 1 Ethical Advisor: 2
SSC Member: 2
Total: 13 Total: 3 16
Community Bankers: 2
Customer: 2
Religious Scholar: 
1
Total: 5 5
Total interviewees 30
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and external voices that challenged the re(construction) of 
the organization ethical values.
Findings: Episodes of Drift and Multivocality 
Surrounding ETB’s Ethico‑faith Identity
In this section, we begin our discussion with the ethical 
vision that was espoused at the inception of ETB’s opera-
tions in 2004. Following its incorporation in 2004, ETB 
focused on fulfilling an aspiration to provide ethico-faith 
banking alternatives. At the time, ETB publicly stated that 
ethico-faith values underpinned all of its operations, as high-
lighted in the following vision and values statement:
Our aim is to provide banking services to the com-
munity at large. We aim to adhere strictly to Shariah, 
as set down in Islamic teaching. All our products and 
services are Shariah compliant as approved by our 
Shariah Supervisory Committee. These services are 
founded on the values established within the Islamic 
faith….Our values come from the values established 
within the Islamic faith, and these values we believe to 
be essential to any well-run, independent bank. (ETB’s 
Vision and Values - 2004)
In both formal and informal media communications ETB 
addressed its vision based on the common Islamic tenets that 
it had to offer appropriate ethical and religious based finan-
cial alternatives. The commitment to follow Islamic princi-
ples of Shariah was also included in ETB’s initial Articles 
of Association, as shown below.
It is intended that the business affairs of the Company 
shall be conducted in accordance with Shariah. Activi-
ties of the Company will at all times be supervised by 
the Shariah Supervisory committee. The Directors of 
the Company are obliged to ensure that the business of 
the Company is at all times Shariah compliant. (ETB’s 
Article of Association - 2004)
ETB further indicated that its products and services 
would be positioned to serve Muslim society by providing 
financial alternatives based on a ‘transcendental’ Islamic 
frame of reference. It sought to promote equity finance by 
offering profit and risk sharing instruments that aimed to 
support the growth of small businesses and entrepreneurs. 
ETB’s ethical ideals strongly suggested the importance of 
providing noninterest-based instruments that protected all 
parties from excessive uncertainty and speculative activity. 
ETB also claimed a clear religious commitment, stating that 
all of its transactions should be in line with the principles of 
Shariah that is overseen by a distinct religious governance 
structure.
The SSC is comprised of experts in the interpretation 
of Islamic law and its application within modern day 
Islamic financial institutions. They are world-leading 
scholars representing a wide spectrum of the Islamic 
faith. The SSC should ensure that Shariah compliance 
is at the heart of everything ETB does and every prod-
uct and service that it offers. (ETB Media reporting)
A team of in-house religious scholars, known as the 
‘Shariah Supervisory Committee’ (SSC), differentiate 
ETB from the Western banks by monitoring the imple-
mentation of ethico-faith principles. The SSC is an inde-
pendent body akin to an audit committee in a conventional 
organization, providing Shariah assurance on all banking 
and financial activities. The SSC was established two years 
Table 2  Documents observed 
and analysed Level Type of documents Documents availability
Regulator Policy Prospectus 1
Discussion Paper 1
Muslim Council Report 1
Bank/institution Article of Association 4
SSC Pronouncements 3
Procedural Documents 18
Shariah Review 8
Shariah Audit Report 14
SSC Products/Services Certificates/Approvals 18
External Report 29
Media Communications 519
National/international guid-
ance
Guidance from the Muslim Council 1
International Shariah Standard 1
International Shariah Audit guidelines 1
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prior to ETB, gaining a licence as an IFI and commenc-
ing business. Shariah assurance work typically starts at 
the time an institution is conceived. The SSC is involved 
in drafting the company’s Article(s) of Association, busi-
ness plans, and product offerings, to ensure the (correct 
and adequate) inclusion of religious compliance princi-
ples. The development of retail banking products, such as 
current and deposit accounts, home finance, and personal 
finance products must be approved by the SSC. Shariah 
compliance aspects of every product are certified by the 
SSC, by issuing a legal opinion (fatwa). They also issue 
Shariah compliance certificates on ETB’s products. An 
excerpt from one of the certified product certificates is as 
follows:
In compliance with the Terms of Reference of the 
Committee, having reviewed the Master Murabahah 
Agreement documentation including all related con-
tracts, literature and all associated processes, and after 
making all required amendments, we the ‘Shariah 
Supervisory Committee’ for Trust Ethical Bank con-
firm that in our opinion the Master Murabahah Agree-
ment is in accordance with the Murabahah principles 
in Islamic finance and therefore we allow the bank to 
provide this facility to its customers. (Shariah compli-
ance certificate – Master Murabahah agreement)
An internal Shariah Compliance Officer (SCO) is respon-
sible for supporting the SSC to undertake regular Shariah 
assurance and an annual Shariah audit, to ensure ethico-
faith principles are sufficiently adhered to in practice. The 
detailed results from these Shariah assurance processes 
complement ETB’s other reports to its stakeholders. Those 
Shariah assurance processes, however, cannot prevent the 
repeated attempts at organizing ETB’s ethico-faith identity 
in the face of various socio-economic pressures, as exempli-
fied in Fig. 1.
Taking cues from Fig. 1, we will elaborate on the three 
periods of drift, and the issues associated and impacting on 
these, in the following sub-sections.
First Episode (2004–2006): Modifying ETB’s Ethical 
Identity to Suit Regulatory Requirements
In this section, we explore the first drift of ETB’s ethical 
identity. In its early years of operation, the main challenge 
ETB faced was to integrate the aspired ethico-faith vision 
as explicated in its Article of Association with existing reg-
ulatory imperatives. The ethico-faith aspiration, however, 
largely proved foreign to a Western banking industry culture 
and regulatory environment. The growing interest of Muslim 
investors in financial alternatives that are in line with reli-
gious belief is seen as an opportunity in the Western market.
Islamic finance is a fast-growing force in the world 
economy, we take an open and principle-based 
approach to regulation. We offer the right environ-
ment for it to flourish in our country. There is huge 
potential for an expansion of Islamic offerings in the 
European financial markets, which will in turn boost 
our country’s position as an international financial cen-
tre. (Chairman of the Financial Authority)
Financial authorities, as expressed above, see Islamic 
banking as an avenue to expand the existing market. Embrac-
ing Islamic finance is also a way to strengthen the country’s 
position as the hub of the European market that may further 
capture global investors. The extract below makes very clear 
that the government view is to not include any faith-based 
elements or Shariah principles in the existing regulatory 
framework.
… The Government does not intend to adopt a state-
led approach to improving standardisation in Islamic 
finance. The Government believes that such an 
approach would not be appropriate … the financial 
authorities are secular bodies, not religious regulators. 
(Government Report on Islamic Finance, 2008)
The opportunity provided for Islamic finance, was not to 
affect the nature of regulatory policies imposed on any finan-
cial companies operating in the country. Islamic finance 
would be encouraged by adopting a ‘no obstacles’ approach 
but the regulatory regime would not be adjusted in any way 
to reflect Islamic Law requirements in order to maintain the 
‘no special favours’ in the financial market:
It is essential we seek out new opportunities to diver-
sify our financial services industry, so the industry 
can continue to prosper and grow. We believe in a ’no 
obstacles, no special favours’ approach when author-
izing Islamic financial institutions and welcome the 
development of this market as it provides certain con-
sumers with financial products that are in line with 
their beliefs. Providers of ethical/faith-based finance 
have the potential to position themselves as a viable 
alternative to mainstream institutions... (Central Bank-
ing Authority)
There clearly was no space for a variation in regulations 
to address, for example, the uniqueness of Islamic finance 
contracts. Regulators have remained reluctant to address 
religious compliance in their standards and guidelines ever 
since ETB’s inception, as shown in the following narrative.
We had no objection in principle to the idea of 
Islamic banks … provided Islamic banks met the 
regulatory requirements. We had a clear economic 
interest in trying to ensure that the conditions for 
a flourishing Islamic market are in place in our 
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country. A soundly financed and prudently man-
aged Islamic institution would be good for Muslim 
consumers, good for innovation and diversity in our 
markets as an international financial centre. (Finan-
cial Authority Officer)
The coherence of the existing regulations is preserved. 
The regulators equally imposed the same level of regula-
tions that governed all banking and financial operations in 
the country. ETB consequently had no choice but to follow 
the regulatory imperative. ETB has to comply to the local 
banking regulations and prudential regulatory framework, 
as narrated below.
Islamic finance products in this country are not regu-
lated any differently from conventional instruments 
and existing legislation and regulations apply. Our 
approach has been to ensure a level playing field for 
Islamic finance products and conventional instruments, 
and so we have proactively monitored and responded 
to any unequal treatment between the two by introduc-
ing remedial legislation and regulations. (The Govern-
ment Islamic Finance Specialist)
The financial authority has been, and is, willing to 
play its part in supporting these developments, within 
its regulatory powers. Although we cannot promote 
Islamic finance (or any other particular kind of finance) 
Fig. 1  Episodes of ethico-faith 
identity drift at ETB
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we can give a clear regulatory framework, which is 
flexible enough to adapt to changes in the market… 
(Financial Authority Report, 2007)
The regulator places a strong emphasis on ensuring a 
level of playing field for all financial institutions. ETB has 
to ensure that any products are both meeting Shariah prin-
ciples and regulatory requirements. Any clashes between 
these requirements are discussed and negotiated to satisfy 
the regulators, as expressed below.
It is impossible to apply faith-based ethical principles 
within the financial services sector without plenty of 
discussion… it is important to bring together practi-
tioners and stakeholders with a very wide range of per-
spectives. (The Government Ethical Finance Advisory 
Member)
At times, ETB has to adjust the nature of its original 
Islamic contracts or legal requirements in order to comply 
to the banking regulations. The liquid asset buffer rules for 
example, requires financial institutions to obtain a liquid 
assets buffer to protect customer investments by using high 
debt securities, reserves in the form of sight deposits in the 
central bank, or investments in designated money market 
funds. Such interest-based transactions, however, breach the 
basic tenet of Shariah principles. The ETB SSC has argued 
that interest-based liquidity instruments should be avoided. 
This example represents one of the tensions ETB faces 
between regulatory requirements and Shariah principles, as 
indicated below:
We have had some discussion with the financial 
authority around the liquid asset buffer requirement 
because there are few Shariah compliant assets that 
conform to the regulatory requirements for the defini-
tion of the liquid asset buffer. There are some that are 
available, but [they are] not 100% appropriate for us. 
(Compliance Manager)
Other regulatory requirements, as shown in the extract 
below, also impinged on ETB’s operations. This happened 
because the regulator wanted to prevent ‘unforeseen conse-
quences’ resulting from the implementation of Islamic laws 
(Birchall 2013; Kurti 2013).
What we do not want is a situation where firms under-
take arbitrage because one form of regulatory treat-
ment offers favours over another. There is, therefore, 
a level playing field…it would not be appropriate, nor 
would it be legally possible, to vary its standards for 
one particular type of institution… (Financial Author-
ity Officer).
Hence, there are clear occasions where the legal aspects 
of Islamic financial transactions are not in line with 
accepted regulatory rules. ETB in respond to that has to 
withdraw the offering of the original Islamic contracts (the 
profit and loss sharing schemes) that represent its identity 
as the legal elements would contradict existing banking 
regulations. The investment risks that customers bear in 
such contracts contradict the required investment guaran-
tee regulatory requirements (Birchall 2013; Kurti 2013). 
This regulatory constraint triggered the shifting of ETB’s 
products from providing profit and risk sharing instru-
ments to other products common in the banking sector in 
the country of its operations.
The regulatory approach is to treat IFIs as it would 
conventional firms, so an IFI would require authori-
sation to carry on regulated activities and obtain the 
necessary permissions from the financial authority. 
IFIs may need to provide additional information in 
certain circumstances, such as the role, if any, that 
the IFI’s Shariah board performs in relation to opera-
tional and financial matters… (Deputy Minister for 
the Government Strategic Policies)
To secure the regulatory approval, as expressed above, 
ETB had to negotiate with the financial authorities to 
balance the implementation of Shariah principles while 
meeting existing regulations. As a result, continuous 
discussions have been taking place between ETB and 
the regulator to achieve consensus on ETB’s operational 
practices.
Certainly we’ll leave it to the industry to establish 
policy practice … We’re trying to facilitate as much 
as possible while still maintaining a level playing field 
… The government was quick to remedy the adverse 
tax treatment for Islamic finance products. The double 
stamp duty land tax charge on shariah-compliant mort-
gages, for example, were also abolished. But, we also 
want to ensure that IFI offers the product more widely, 
which would allow the Islamic bank to “future proof” 
the facility by ensuring there is adequate demand. 
(Financial Authority Officer).
The regulator, as seen above, argued that sufficient regu-
latory facilities had been allotted to ETB to operate on a 
European financial market. In order to resolve the tensions, 
ETB took an approach to reduce the practical complexities 
surrounding Islamic financial contracts. We are also able to 
trace those tensions in both internal and external documents 
that we analysed, as seen in Table 3.
As seen in Table 3, there is pressure for ETB to revisit 
its value proposition to also consider its suitability within 
the existing regulatory imperative. Islamic financial schemes 
that clash with regulatory requirements are modified or even 
removed. The SSC Member and the Compliance Manager 
have to weigh both Islamic and banking regulations to 
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achieve a negotiated version of the products at some point 
as expressed below.
Ehm… So we’ve been in fairly very lengthy discus-
sions with them over that aspect of our business. The 
financial authority certainly understands some other 
complexities and challenges that Shariah finance 
presents in operating under this kind of conventional 
banking regulations. It is an ongoing dialogue… 
(Compliance Manager).
A problem would be if we couldn’t solve this issue 
of the specificity of Islamic financial contracts. This 
should be developed and used in this [specific] way, so 
we should get some exemption, as long as the inten-
tion is to finance the client. If there is a proof that 
the intention is different, then let them [regulator offi-
cials] implement the acts/regulatory rules. This must 
be approached in a relaxed manner, so that a conven-
tional bank and we can be treated on an equal footing 
… As long as this is not really solved, no Islamic bank 
can work here. (SSC Member).
Both views above show that certain pressures and obsta-
cles may influence the way ETB frames its ethical identity 
to offer Shariah compliant banking solutions. The identity 
attached to the original Islamic contracts/schemes cannot 
be implemented in pure form. Banking regulators play an 
influential role in shaping ETB’s identity. Inevitably, the 
products that ETB offers to the market must meet the legal 
elements in place in order to secure regulatory approval, 
as discussed below.
The basic regulations for all banks also comprise the 
requirements for Islamic bank….it means they need 
to meet regulatory feasibilities, all banks have to do 
this…. (Shariah Compliance Officer).
As a consequence, regulatory pressures seem to have 
brought about the modification/adaptation of ETB’s 
ethico-faith claims, as shown in the amended Article of 
Association dating from 2006:
The company is a Shariah compliant bank, which 
operates according to the Shariah guidelines. The 
Shariah will govern these articles as long as they 
do not conflict with the applicable laws of the land. 
(Amended Article of Association - 2006).
ETB simply had no choice than to follow to the regula-
tory logic that dominated the financial industry at the time 
it was established. ETB’s ethical identity, as exemplified 
by the aforementioned quote, came to represent a tem-
porary convergence of conflicting references that shaped 
what constitutes ethical banking within the boundaries of 
religious and regulatory imperatives. This has been high-
lighted in the upper part of Fig. 1.
Table 3  Documents observed and analysed during the first episode
Tension in the first episode Some of documents analysed Main information discussed
Seeking approval for Shariah compliant bank-
ing
Policy Prospectus, Article of Association, 
Media Communications
Shariah principles as a basis for ETB operation
Discussion Paper Facility provided for Islamic finance with equal 
regulatory treatment
Muslim Council Report, Guidance from the 
Muslim Council
The effort in helping the government to under-
stand Islamic finance and how to remove 
obstacles for ETB operation
Challenges due to equal regulatory treatment SSC Products/Services Certificates/Approvals, 
SSC Pronouncements
Clashes between regulatory requirements and 
Shariah principles, which includes guarantee 
schemes, double taxation, etc
Discussion Paper, SSC Pronouncements, 
Procedural Documents
Negotiation with the regulators and decision to 
modify Shariah principles that contradict the 
local rules and regulation
Muslim Council Report, Guidance from the 
Muslim Council, External Report, Media 
Communications
The Muslim Council discussion to provide 
facilities/supports to achieve resolutions for 
regulatory obstacles in ETB operation
Responses to overcome the regulatory chal-
lenges
Article of Association, SSC Pronouncements, 
Media Communications
Modification of Shariah principles as the basis 
of ETB operation by acknowledging the need 
to comply to the local law and rules/regula-
tions
SSC Products/Services Certificates/Approvals, 
Procedural Documents
Modification of the original contracts (profit 
and loss sharing investment schemes) in order 
to make it more acceptable/to achieve regula-
tory approval
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Second Episode (2006 to the End of 2013): Reverse 
Engineering of Islamic Financial Products to Meet 
Market Demands
In this episode, we explore the drift of ETB’s ethico-faith 
identity from 2006 to the end of 2013, as it faced the chal-
lenges of sustaining itself on the market given the increasing 
financial losses. The pressure to provide competitive prod-
ucts to a wider market segment subsequently increased. In 
this situation, engaging in the reverse engineering of Islamic 
financial products surprisingly came to be seen as a way to 
rectify the alleged lack of attention that had been devoted 
to securing high returns and capital growth of the business 
in its early life:
In the beginning, we weren’t driven by the desire 
to make a return, and hadn’t got the capital to make 
an impact, so it was all about passion. I was doing 
seminars in mosques and for business leaders, then we 
started building a branch network and I spent two years 
on the road. (Managing Director)
ETB, as a relatively new player on the financial market, 
struggled to compete with existing financial institutions that 
had a long history and established market positions, despite 
the efforts undertaken by, among others, its managing direc-
tor to strengthen its identity. The size of the Muslim popula-
tion, constituting ETB’s primary potential market, continued 
to be relatively small, below 3% of the overall population in 
ETB’s main market.
As an Islamic bank in a Western country, where Mus-
lim are the minority …you have to be able to tap into 
the wider market…Unfortunately, all the fixed over-
heads burned our cash. We strengthened the manage-
ment team, and started pushing deposit accounts, but 
the fuel was still running out. (Managing Director).
ETB’s marketing practices to attract potential custom-
ers of an aspired ethical identity were extensive and time-
consuming for a new organization in a relatively stable and 
well-developed market. ETB turned out to have insufficient 
capital to successfully establish itself on the market. Along 
with the stiff competition, these development processes 
placed enormous burdens on ETB’s financial resources.
… being Shariah compliant isn’t sufficient for cus-
tomers to buy our products. We also have to be com-
petitive. You know…. Once there were some cus-
tomers who would come to us as a matter of choice 
because we were Shariah compliant—it was in line 
with their faith and ideology. However, not all Mus-
lims will feel that way. They won’t feel compelled to 
align themselves with a Shariah compliant alterna-
tive, if it does not provide them with competitive 
products… It has to be priced correctly. If it is a lot 
more expensive, and it doesn’t give the return that 
they expect to have, Shariah compliance may not be 
enough for Muslims. (Senior Marketing Officer).
ETB tried hard to attract clients from across the com-
munity to increase the level of customer deposit by mar-
keting the attractive ethical aspects of Islamic financial 
products. The Muslim community was the main targeted 
customer group, as ETB’s products had primarily been 
designed to suit their ethico-faith based beliefs. Despite 
the attractiveness of the products it became clear custom-
ers also demanded competitive returns. The fees on such 
products, however, could not decrease below a certain 
threshold if ETB’s operational costs were to be recovered. 
The inability to lower costs had a huge impact on ETB’s 
financial performance.
The balance sheet isn’t looking good. We don’t have 
enough assets, simple as that. Hmm… we have not got 
critical mass in terms of retail assets. There are factors 
that kind of align to that. Hmm…. such as] the signifi-
cant drop in base rates. You know the last two years 
now, hmm…. the earnings on treasury assets have been 
substantially reduced. Hmm…. which is impacted the 
ability to achieve profitability. …. Particularly where 
we were sitting on large amounts of essentially cash, 
short-term funds, short-term customers’ funds that we 
couldn’t then use to finance longer-term retail assets. 
The return on liquid assets was substantially reduced. 
(Manager of Finance).
The complex market challenges hurt the financial perfor-
mance of ETB. During the period 2008–2010, for example, 
ETB suffered an average yearly loss of almost £4 million. 
The declining financial performance required ETB to revisit 
its product range. In the third quarter of 2009, ETB started 
to engage in the reverse engineering of its faith-based ethi-
cal/Islamic financial products, through which it sought to 
replicate the effect of conventional banking products, while 
trying to keep contractual frameworks in compliance with 
Shariah requirements, as seen in both internal and external 
documents that we analyse in Table 4.
As discussed in Table 4, the reverse engineering seemed 
to yield products that conformed to the legal form of Sha-
riah, but these did not really fulfil the substance of its ethico-
faith principles. Through these ingenious innovations of 
Shariah compliant products, ETB achieved the economic 
effects of the conventional products that contain ethically 
prohibited transactions. In order to support these innova-
tions, the SSC supported the adjustment of Shariah princi-
ples governing ETB’s products. The difficulty in implement-
ing all principles of Shariah in the Islamic finance industry 
is acknowledge by the regulator, as discussed below.
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In Islamic finance there are impediments to achieve 
an ideal state. A number of aspects which makes it 
very difficult to say that the standard that we issued 
must be adopted or must be enforced. The difficulties 
are in relation to the capacity at the institutional level 
[IFI level] to adopt and enforce the Shariah standard. 
There are diversity of market and institutional devel-
opments, and many of them are not in the position to 
adopt the standard as effectively as we wish. (Inter-
national Regulator for Prudential Practices of Islamic 
Finance Industry—Chairman).
The adjustment of Shariah principles to satisfy local reg-
ulatory requirements and business demands is considered 
acceptable. The regulator agrees that the ability of this new 
business to sustain itself in the banking industry in Europe 
is also essential. Those rationales underlie ETB’s choice. 
It is difficult to move away from the market imperatives. 
For example, the Islamic/Shariah compliant mortgage range 
was expanded during the period of 2009 with a fixed charge 
(called ‘rental’ in ETB’s terms) product. The fixed charge 
provided a similar outcome to interest charges commonly 
paid on conventional mortgages. Following the success of 
investment banks to attract Middle Eastern investors, ETB 
also introduced a fixed-term buy for home ownership. The 
latter product gained substantial interest among targeted for-
eign investors. ETB also engaged in further modifications of 
specific ethical principles requiring all financial transactions 
to be based on actual assets involving real transactions. In 
supporting the company’s approach, Shariah assurance has 
been selectively appropriated, by accepting a different inter-
pretation of what constitute noninterest-based transactions.
In 2010, given the losses it still suffered, ETB felt it 
had no other option than to sell 80% of its equity stake to 
a foreign IFI. This takeover resulted in a flow of £20 mil-
lion additional capital that allowed ETB to sustain its opera-
tions. The new owner set out to leverage its established retail 
brand in the Islamic finance sector, and increase sales of key 
products acceptable for the wider market. In late 2010, ETB 
began to launch more modified products to better fit with 
the market appetite.
We have to recognize that the Islamic finance business 
is relatively small… All your business models must be 
built up around the resource constraints that you have 
but still deliver the high expectations of the market 
we serve… ETB, in the mid of the 2000s, was in a 
kind of struggle with the £20 million of capital [from 
the new shareholder as a result of the first corporate 
takeover]. It means you have to be very careful of what 
you deliver. You have to allocate the capital carefully, 
in terms of the products that you deploy… You always 
need to be able to do more with less continuously… 
(ETB’s new CEO).
The regulators for the Islamic finance industry do not see 
this adjustment as an issue from a Shariah point of view, as 
suggested by the prudential regulator below. It is regarded 
as a necessity in order for ETB to maintain its performance 
in the Western market.
We need sequencing. We cannot do everything. We 
have to do everything, but we could ask what we need 
to do first? The regulators think the first thing is to 
issue the licence, but they have forgotten a couple of 
things. They forget that the bank needs liquidity man-
agement instruments. The regulator also needs to know 
what the Islamic bank is facing. So, I think sequenc-
ing is a very critical issue. (International Regulator 
Table 4  Documents observed and analysed during the second episode
Tension in the second episode Some of documents analysed Main information discussed
Financial challenges and difficulties in imple-
menting the Shariah contracts
External Report, Media Communications Financial issues, which includes high level of 
costs and losses ETB face
External Report, Media Communications The need to be more competitive in the market 
to sustain the business within the high com-
petition in the market
Discussion Paper, SSC Pronouncements, Pro-
cedural Documents, SSC Products/Services 
Certificates/Approvals
Decision to focus on maintaining the business 
by focusing on more attractive contracts for 
both Muslim and Non-Muslim customers
Reverse engineering of Islamic financial 
products
SSC Pronouncements, Media Communica-
tions, SSC Products/Services Certificates/
Approvals, Procedural Documents
Development of hybrid products or combi-
nations of several Islamic contracts that 
produce similar schemes/products to that of 
the conventional competitor
External Report, Media Communications, SSC 
Pronouncements
Justification of using conventional banking 
product reference, or basis for target return, 
or products charges, such as effective yield 
or the market interest rate, etc
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for Prudential Practices of Islamic Finance Industry 
– Chairman).
The regulator above understands that ETB cannot achieve 
its ethical ideals as projected. The regulators try to take into 
account the different challenges ETB faces in the market. 
The regulator is in support to ETB’s strategy in the reengi-
neering of its products in order to offer competitive returns 
to customers. In addition to maintain liquidity, the regulator 
supports ETB’s strategy to engage in reverse engineering 
of its Shariah compliant products. The reverse engineering, 
of Islamic financial products, produced instruments that 
showed only tenuous links to any real sale or asset-based 
transaction, as suggested in the following text:
Islamic consumer financing transactions represent an 
agreement whereby the company buys a commodity or 
goods and then sells it/them to the customer with an 
agreed profit mark-up with settlement of the sale price 
being deferred for an agreed period. The customer may 
subsequently sell the commodity purchased to generate 
cash. (ETB annual report - 2011)
The type of financing mentioned above represents a 
virtual sale and buy-back transaction, without any real 
exchange of assets, as the customer’s and the bank’s inten-
tions are to receive and provide cash financing based on a 
deferred payment. Elements of the Muslim community and 
the local religious scholar criticized this transaction as a 
back door to interest (riba)—its structure had a clear resem-
blance to interest-based financing. This reverse engineered 
scheme is well known as a tawarruq (sale and buy-back) 
contract. The legal structure looks Shariah compliant, but 
in essence it may best be seen as camouflage for a lending 
transaction covered by a sales-based transaction. The OIC 
Fiqh Academy, a worldwide reference on Shariah rulings, 
considers the sales and buy-back (tawarruq) as a deception, 
to the extent it may comply with the letter of the law, but 
it does not really comply with the spirit of Shariah (Goud 
2010):
ETB offers an Islamic banking solution that has to 
be competitive and at the same time be able to offer 
solutions for Muslims in the West. (Senior Treasury 
Manager)
Arguing the need to provide acceptable market solu-
tions to meet specific market demands, ETB employed the 
engineered sales and buy-back (tawarruq) as a contract for 
personal financial products from 2010 onward. ETB also 
offers similar transaction structures in its commodity-trading 
(murabahah) products. This enabled the company to virtu-
ally buy commodities on the spot market, and sell them to 
a customer for the spot price plus a profit margin. Subse-
quently, ETB acts as the customer’s agent to reverse the sale 
on the spot market. The SSC rectifies the permissibility of 
such contracts by taking into account the challenges faced 
in the regulatory environment by Islamic banks. This is how 
one of the members on the SSC framed this permissibility:
.… the consumer protection act and the sales protec-
tion act will be implemented if we do ordinary muraba-
hah [sales-based transactions]. If we buy a car and sell 
it, if an accident happened and there’s a fault in the car, 
the bank is responsible first, it is liable. Nobody wants 
to take such liability, it can be very dangerous finan-
cially. So for this reason, the bank only does tawarruq 
and commodity murabahah.... (Shariah Supervisory 
Committee Member 2)
There is almost no physical commodity exchanged in the 
trading of commodity murabahah products. There is no real 
economic result following from such transactions either, but 
a customer receives cash alongside a deferred liability to the 
bank. This deferred liability equals the cash received plus a 
pre-agreed, fixed rate of expected profit, which is a seman-
tic symbol of profit to replace the interest element within 
the contract. The SSC is aware that these contracts create a 
similar structure to the competitors’ interest-based financial 
products. However, they choose to selectively adapt their 
interpretation of Shariah rules in these contracts to suit the 
ETB’s demand for a steady profit and risk avoidance behav-
iour. The revenue recognition of these products were based 
on the predominant Western discounted cash flow model. 
That model does not represent the Islamic tenets in avoid-
ing interest however, as evidenced by the information below 
from ETB’s annual report:
Income, on both Commodity Murabahah and Wakalah 
receivables, is recognized on an effective yield basis. 
The effective yield rate is the rate that exactly dis-
counts the estimated future cash payments and receipts 
through the agreed payment term of the contract to the 
carrying amount of the receivable. The effective yield 
is established on initial recognition of the asset and is 
not revised subsequently. (Described in ETB annual 
reports from 2009 to 2013)
ETB uses BBR or LIBOR to price its products, as these 
are the most accurate, widely accepted and consistent 
benchmarks for financing. This allows ETB to meet 
the important Shariah criteria of avoiding uncertainty. 
If rental rates were to be used as a benchmark instead, 
there would be too much variation… which would not 
be practical. (SSC Member - minutes of a Q&A ses-
sion in Shariah Scholar Public Forum in 2010)
The rate or margin of the above product is also bench-
marked against market interest rates. The SSC supported 
ETB’s approach and argued that this would bring no harm to 
the ethicality of the actual contract, as interest benchmarks 
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are commonly used on the market, hence avoiding excessive 
uncertainty. The SSC further argued that the use of interest-
based benchmarks and reverse engineering products could 
be used for operational practicality and to embrace the mar-
ket demands in order to have a stable financial outcome. The 
selective Shariah interpretations and guidance in particular 
enabled the further adjustment of ETB’s ethical identity 
due to the need to accord ethico-faith principles and market 
imperatives.
Third Episode (2014–2018): Corporate Investment 
Banking Meets Shareholder Demands
In this section, we explore the third drift of ethico-faith 
identity as ETB went through the last change of ownership 
in 2014. Despite attaining the highest level of retail asset 
finance and deposit balances during its existence in 2012, 
ETB still found itself facing losses and also difficulties in 
competing with a number of Western financial institutions 
operating in the country in which it is located. Another take-
over of ETB’s majority ownership by a new shareholder in 
2014 gave ETB an additional £76 million of capital to spend.
As we summarized in Table 5, both ETB’s internal and 
external documents show that through acquisition the new 
shareholder has a strong ambition to expand their multina-
tional business into the European market. ETB was subse-
quently rebranded as ‘NewETB’, with a determination to 
strengthen its market performance, as discussed below.
The acquisition of the former ETB is the gateway 
in expanding our existing business into the grow-
ing European market. We intend to build upon these 
excellent foundations, not only through the continued 
growth of Shariah compliant savings and home finance 
products to European retail customers, but also by sig-
nificantly developing the Bank’s commercial business 
activities…We look forward to supporting NewETB 
in its growth plans by strengthening its balance sheet 
and position in the market. (New major shareholder).
The new CEO launched a strategy to transition the bank’s 
operations and place more emphasis on corporate bank-
ing and premier services for wealthy customers. NewETB 
retained its managing director after the second takeover, but 
the company began to actively promote a different perspec-
tive on ethico-faith principles in its operations. The new 
shareholder tended to retain the Islamic label but took a 
more permissive approach to the importance of the ethico-
faith principles. NewETB subsequently moved to include the 
financing of commercial property as an important strategic 
priority.
… The owners want to make their bank into a global 
brand, and we will be the European footprints of that Ta
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ambition. Our name will change at the end of 2014 
from ETB to NewETB. We will always be an IFI for 
retail customers. However, we will become more of a 
commercial bank, so there will be a greater focus on 
corporate and real estate finance. (Managing Director)
The bank launched a dedicated branch to provide premier 
banking services for high net worth individuals. By focusing 
attention on this clientele, NewETB sought to secure itself a 
prestigious position in the market. The premier investment 
branch is dedicated to large corporate clients and private 
investors from the Middle Eastern countries. The premier 
service offers project finance for large investments, ranging 
from developments in the private rental sector, retail parks, 
mixed-use industrial warehouses, and investments in major, 
new build, residential schemes.
These changes and shifts have enabled NewETB to 
engage in similar practices as conventional banks resulting 
in favourable commercial outcomes. NewETB celebrated 
this achievement in 2015, as profits rose by a stunning 700%. 
‘These are an excellent set of results.[NewETB] …is grow-
ing at a rapid but manageable and well-controlled pace’, the 
Chairman of the Board reported in one of ETB’s media com-
munications. NewETB’s real estate assets exceeded £1.2bn 
by 2015. The government is in support to this shift of busi-
ness model, as shown in the following comment.
International investors are now seeing less glamorous 
but equally sound shariah-compliant infrastructure 
investments in this hub of European market. Not only 
in the retail sector but also new innovative products 
and services. With the increase of the middle-class 
Muslim population, there’s also an increase in demand 
for sophisticated financial products. IFI try to meet 
some of this demand by developing new products and 
standard contracts for Islamic transactions. This will 
drive down costs … IFI should find solutions compat-
ible with the new Muslim values that are also com-
patible with global trends. (Government International 
Strategy Advisor)
The influential advisor above expresses his view that fol-
lowing global trends in the finance and banking industry is 
the right strategy. It is seen as beneficial for IFI’s cost and 
liquidity management, as well as being in line with govern-
ment and investors demands. This progress is appreciated 
by other stakeholders, as ETB receives an award for the best 
European financial products in 2017. ETB is classified as 
the ‘Best Fixed Account Provider’ and as the ‘Outstanding 
Large Business’ financial service provider. These awards 
marked the alleged success of NewETB in fulfilling the 
shareholders’ ambition to scale up the business, especially 
with respect to its product competitiveness and brand repu-
tation in the market. NewETB also engaged in a number 
of highly leveraged financing and syndication deals to fund 
large-scale commercial projects.
NewETB debuts in the Shariah compliant residential 
mortgage-backed market and becomes the first IFI to 
issue sukuk outside an Islamic country. The Associa-
tion for Financial Markets in Europe reports some 
€73.1bn of securitised product was issued in Europe 
in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2017…. Is the securitisa-
tion segment set for an upswing? (ETB’s Media Report 
on mortgage-backed sukuk issuance - Fourth Quarter 
of 2017)
From 2017, NewETB also engaged in a number of highly 
leveraged financing and syndication deals to fund large-scale 
commercial projects. NewETB issued the first funding sukuk 
(Islamic bonds) in Europe, as reported in the media release 
above. NewETB argues sukuk issuance offered a Shariah 
compliant mortgage-backed debt obligation, where the cash 
flows derived from a pool of residential debt packaged into 
a special purpose vehicle that could be purchased by inves-
tors. The NewETB sukuk is backed by a portfolio of prime 
home purchase mortgages and based on securitization of 
NewETB residential assets. Standard & Poor’s provisionally 
rated the £250 million sukuk AAA. It was also rated Aaa by 
Moody’s Investors Service. NewETB set the return at 0.8% 
more than LIBOR as the floating rate lending benchmark. 
This offered investors a significant premium to traditional 
mortgage-bonds.
We issued the first Shariah-compliant bond based pub-
lic home finance-backed securitisation…The intention 
of the originator and lead manager was to structure 
a transaction that, while Shariah-compliant, also rep-
licated as far as possible a conventional residential 
mortgage backed securitisation….It has been designed 
to ensure that it is recognisable as high quality liquid 
assets…. this has resulted in high levels of demand 
from conventional institutions as well as from Islamic 
investors… (NewETB media communication 2017)
With this securitization issue, NewETB’successfully’ 
copied the money creation systems used by its conventional 
Western financial market counterparts. It has managed to 
co-opt the Shariah compliance assurance framework to pro-
vide a seal of approval for this type of sophisticated finan-
cial product that went well beyond ETB’s more traditional 
ethico-faith based vision. The use of home finance assets as 
an underlying instrument for Islamic bond issuance exem-
plifies the creation of transactions that not only neglect the 
rights and ownership of the Islamic mortgage customer but 
also produce equivalent cash flows as conventional bonds.
The ambition of the new shareholder for NewETB to 
lead the market created forces that we believe caused an 
even more substantial drift of the company’s identity and 
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ethico-faith based values and mission than in the second 
episode. The competition and pressures to provide higher 
returns on products compared to the average return in the 
market illustrates the move towards a strategy that places a 
strong focus on debt-based product portfolios.
There were times when the challenges were immense, 
ETB lost money for nine successive years ... Now 
though, our balance sheet is over £600m, our books 
have doubled for each of the last three years, and we 
are recording a profit month-by-month. NewETB is 
growing at a rapid, but manageable and well-controlled 
pace…It is now our commercial approach to help 
structure transactions to suit clients’ requirements. 
(ETB Senior Executive)
In 2017, while offering higher rates of return than its 
competitors, NewETB achieved the largest property book of 
any IFI in the country. Commercial property finance became 
an increasingly important growth area for the bank. By the 
end of 2017, NewETB’s real estate assets had increased 
by 44% at close to £400 million. ‘The ability to attract a 
non-Muslim audience [wider public] should be a key per-
formance indicator for IFI’, the Retail Manager of NewETB 
suggested in one of our interviews. In the first term of 2017, 
the rate of return achieved best buy status from the banking 
rating agency. The bank has more or less battered and baffled 
its conventional competitors by offering 2-year fixed-term 
deposit rates at 2.22%. In the first quarter of 2018, it offered 
higher rates compared to its closest competitor by 0.12 per-
centage points. NewETB also boosted the rate on its 3-year 
fixed return to outstrip all rival accounts of the same term, by 
paying 2.32%. The short and long term interest base and the 
instant access saving accounts are also offered at ranges from 
0.25 to 1.5%, which are higher than the leading conventional 
banks in the country at hand.
If NewETB developed a product that is fully structured 
according to Shariah requirements is not in line with 
the market appetite, then the product will not sell... 
The market wants a product that guarantees the prin-
cipal amount and gives a competitive return regard-
less of the structure. Therefore, they will have to make 
concessions and lower its standards to meet market 
demands and possibly mimic conventional products… 
(Independent Islamic Finance Adviser)
Instead of providing equity financing, NewETB is seen 
to engage quite heavily in money creation without having 
any productive activities alongside. An independent analyst 
provided the following, brief summary on the changes in the 
financing strategy by NewETB:
Critics would say it’s a question of semantics in terms 
of the difference between the expected profit and fixed 
interest. For consumers, the fact that it’s classified as 
expected profit rather than guaranteed, naturally makes 
them cynical and occasionally creates fear when the 
rate won’t be met. I think the lack of guarantee is a 
reason why they’re not more popular … consumers are 
sceptical but this is slowly changing. They (NewETB] 
are starting to move more into the mainstream…. 
(Independent Financial Products Analyst)
The new, fixed-term saving products and bonds resemble 
mainstream interest-based financial instruments on the mar-
ket. The similarity of financing structure and returns offered 
now contradicts the narrative that ETB supported during 
the first decade of its operations. The Retail Manager of 
NewETB argues, ‘…. it doesn’t mean that the practices will 
represent the spirit of the name. The ethical label makes it 
globally appealing.’ This view, in part, reflects the adapta-
tion and rationalization of NewETB’s strategy to shift to 
high-leveraged financing and syndication deals that are in 
effect similar to the practices of Western banks.
As discussed in the annual report 2017, ‘NewETB is real-
ising its vision through its deep understanding of its cus-
tomers and by creating appropriate products and services to 
meet their needs, while supporting the aim to maintain its 
robust and steady growth with sustained profitability. New-
ETB set its product to be the Best Buy in the market’. It is 
clear that this strategic vision of the new shareholder has 
come at the cost of the original identity of the bank. The 
concept of Sharia compliance has been stretched and the 
concepts of empowering the public through the principles 
of a shared economy seem to have been lost, as the bank 
gradually adjusted its practices to match its (for long, quite 
direct financial) situation and changed ambitions.
Contributions
This paper aims to provide a theorized account of our 
empirical exploration of changes in the ethico-faith identity 
of a particular IFI called ‘ETB’, and later ‘NewETB’. We 
described the evolutionary drifts of ETB’s ethical identity 
across a 14-year period. Our compartmentalization of the 
period ought not to be taken as three completely separate or 
different periods of drift. We offer the division into periods 
as a simplification to focus our attention on the predomi-
nant changes in each episode within a continuous period 
of discursive struggle (Alvesson and Deetz 2000). These 
struggles required negotiations, mediations and discursive 
positioning of several actors’ voices (Antaki et al. 1996; 
Klitsie et al. 2018) into dialogic constructions and recon-
structions (Beech 2008; Sveningsson and Alvesson 2003) of 
the organization’s ethico-faith identity. This we have tried to 
summarize in Fig. 1.
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Our interpretations illustrate that the multivocality of an 
organization’s ethical identity formation takes place through 
a long process of drift, in which it is not always eminently 
clear whose ‘voice’ dominates the proceedings, and to 
what extent the organization is in charge of these proceed-
ings itself (Alvesson and Robertson 2016; Ciborra 2000; 
Gherardi 2006; Quattrone and Hopper 2001). We offer this 
theorization as a way to appreciate the changes in attitude 
to the application of Shariah principles to financial prod-
uct authenticity and to changes in the (alleged) authentic-
ity with which financial products and product development 
procedures gradually drifted from their earlier purpose. We 
thereby contribute to the emerging literature of organization 
ethical identity (Balmer et al. 2007; Koning and Waistell 
2012; Verbos et al. 2007) in organizations, by arguing the 
two following points:
Drift as an Enduring Strategy to Achieve 
the Sustainability of Organization’s Ethical Identity
We argue that the sustainability of an organization’s ethical 
identity on the global market requires an ability to embrace 
multiple voices, interests, and rationalities that enables 
organizations to drift within the incomplete organizing 
of its ethico-faith identity (Ciborra 2000; Gherardi 2006; 
Quattrone and Hopper 2001). We view an organization’s 
malleability in this respect as a way to respond to environ-
mental and competitive pressures (Cook and Yanow 1993; 
Corley and Gioia 2003). Our findings extend Alvesson and 
Robertson’s (2016) idea to move away from the reification 
of identity. In our case, the changes of ETB’s ethical iden-
tity have not been shaped by a linear process. They effec-
tively featured overlapping processes of drift, through which 
multiple and conflicted identities and values interacted and 
evolved. This is shown by the drift of (New)ETB’s ethico-
faith identity to suit the regulatory, market and the share-
holders’ ambitions.
In our case, the ability to drift can be seen as an enduring 
strategy through which an organization evolves in a series 
of changes of its ethical identity. These changes represent 
a continuous shifting in the organization’s core ethical val-
ues as it seeks to transcend internal and external contingent 
factors. The empirical evidence we provide of regulator 
attitudes and of interactions with regulators show a process 
of continuous discussion in creating an enduring strategy, 
through which the ethico-faith identity is rationalized in 
line with the regulatory demands. The regulator, the market, 
and ethico-faith imperatives are weaved together in order to 
achieve an alignment of ethical identity and market-regu-
latory requirements. Shifts in the authenticity of applying 
ethico-faith principles are reinforced by changes in business 
strategy to suit both regulatory and market prescriptions and 
current managerial intentions.
The ethico-faith principles that were meant to serve as 
living codes of ethics guiding organizational culture, opera-
tional processes, and (New)ETB’s strategy were discursively 
rationalized in order to respond to regulatory, market and 
institutional pressures (Verbos et al. 2007). This enduring 
strategy seems necessary to (superficially) maintain the ethi-
cal identity to which ETB aspired, by modifying/appropri-
ating its faith-based ethical principles that govern the ethi-
cal values of the organization, the structure of its financial 
products, and the business model to accord with prevailing 
socio-economic requirements. ETB is aware that it needs to 
engage in a continuous dialogue with regulatory, market and 
institutional imperatives and reflect these into the construc-
tions and reconstructions of its ethico-faith principles.
Multivocality of Ethical Identity in the Discursive 
Positioning of Rationalities and Praxis
We extend the discussion around the dialogic constructions 
of organization identity (Beech 2008; Sveningsson and 
Alvesson 2003) by showing how an organization embraces 
discursive positioning and multivocality in its constructions/
reconstructions of identity. We argue that organizations need 
to embrace different features of ethical positioning and view-
points about the organization and the activities its mem-
bers undertake, depending on different influences at differ-
ent stages of organizational life. The ethical identity of an 
organization transcends its contingent factors, and includes 
multiple rationalities and praxis that exist simultaneously in 
the surrounding socio-economic, regulatory and institutional 
context.
Viewing the multivocality and the spatiotemporal 
sequences of ethical identity drift allows us to portray the 
messy everyday world that looks beyond a mechanical view 
of organization identity (re)construction (Ciborra 2000). The 
ethical identity of an organization has a tendency to drift in 
these often unpredictable processes in ways that cannot be 
predicted in advance. We have observed and reported the 
somewhat malleable nature of ethico-faith principles in the 
IFI setting in question, and have tried to summarize this 
in Fig. 1. This malleability takes shape as ETB sought to 
respond to the aspirations of various stakeholders within its 
institutional setting. ETB responds to perceived needs in the 
light of constraints applied by existing regulatory and market 
practices. Regulator rationalities and praxis in conjunction 
with market practices shaped and reshaped ETB’s ethico-
faith identity. The adjustments to ethico-faith aspirations 
also evolved around the multiple company takeovers that 
led to the restructuring of ETB and the growth of NewETB.
The rationalities and praxis within ETB are always in 
flux. It requires ETB’s agility and flexibility in construct-
ing and reconstructing its ethical identity. In this process of 
becoming, the organization’s ability to tune in to the voices 
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of regulator and the wider market participants allowed 
for fragmentation as well as for integration of what may 
be perceived as the company’s aspired ethical identity. An 
organization’s ethical identity, it follows, is relatively open 
to appropriation and modification given the values prevail-
ing in its socio-economic context. As a consequence, ETB 
had to modify its chosen aspirational ethical identity (fully 
based on Islamic faith), and engage in ingenious approaches 
involving reinterpreting, adapting and modifying the ethical 
aspect of its organizational processes.
Limitations and Further Avenues for Research
Although our study covers a fourteen years period, our case 
study and the data from interviews, observations have been 
collected in the last five years of that period, and hence, 
from 2013 onwards. We therefore rely partly on retrospective 
accounts from research participants. To resolve this issue, 
we triangulated this information with rich archival data that 
is well kept in the organization we studied. This proved to 
be especially helpful when studying the process changes that 
allowed us to explore various members’ accounts about the 
continuous drift and multivocality nature of NewETB’s ethi-
cal identity.
Our access to data such as minutes and agendas has 
allowed us to study the drift process in greater detail. Future 
ethical identity research could shed light on external stake-
holders’ perspectives on identity drift and how it influences 
their investment, and other, related decisions. The future 
development of ethically inspired organizations that engage 
with highly leverage products and how such organizations 
respond to the ethical and business tensions they experi-
ence would also be an interesting avenue of research. We 
suggest IFI and other faith-inspired organizations ought to 
reflect on the discursive positioning of their stakeholders’ 
voices (Antaki et al. 1996). They should critically reflect on 
the drift of the ethico-faith commitments/value references in 
their business practices and the extent to which ethico-faith 
references are truly maintained as opposed to rationalized in 
terms of Western, neo-liberalist market hegemonies.
Conclusion
Our paper shows how drift serves as an enduring strategy 
to sustain the IFI in a position that complements and sup-
plements the prescribed knowledge and practices of con-
ventional banking and finance (Warde 2010). In order to 
achieve the sustainability of its ethical aspirations, the com-
pany needed to engage in a rationalization of organizational 
practices and business models that were acceptable for its 
wider stakeholders and market participants. Ethical identity, 
we assert, naturally has to drift to enable a construction of 
identity that better reflects the homogenization of the global 
financial markets.
Continuous identity (re)constructions of ethical identity 
in a faith-inspired context, such as the one experienced by 
NewETB in our case, involves interactions among contin-
gent factors in an organization’s socio-economic environ-
ment and a variety of transformative processes of what con-
stitutes ethical identity. These contingent factors can require 
organizations to revisit and disengage from what may have 
been previously seen as an ideal, or strategic, ethical identity. 
These changes are occasionally dramatic but more often sub-
tly while the organization retains aspects of its prior identify 
while engaging in these shifts over time. Ethical principles 
are somewhat pliable in the face of organizational restruc-
turing, such as changes in corporate ownership, influential 
exogenous values and regulatory prescriptions.
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